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INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of World War II, liberal constitutionalism 
emerged as a default design choice for political systems across 
Europe and North America. It then diffused more widely across 
the globe as a whole.1 This style of constitutionalism typically 
hinges on a written constitution that includes an enumeration of 
individual rights, the existence of rights-based judicial review, a 
heightened threshold for constitutional amendment, a commit-
ment to periodic democratic elections, and a commitment to the 
rule of law. This commitment can be broadly understood as en-
suring that administrative and adjudicative functions operate 
autonomously from, and potentially limit, powerful factions or 
leaders. While its details vary from one context to another, 
this is a form of constitutionalism that broadly seeks to protect 
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 1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth 
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democracy and limit power.2 It is this bundle of institutional de-
sign choices that was once viewed as the default governance op-
tion at the “end of history,”3 securely nestled in an “open and 
rule-based” liberal international order.4 
To be sure, liberal constitutionalism has never been perfectly 
or universally implemented. In the democratic core of Europe 
and North America, large subaltern populations (often comprising 
distinct racial or ethnic minorities) were kept at arm’s length 
from full economic or political participation. What is more, when 
faced with national emergencies, these countries have been 
quick to ignore important constitutional limits.5 Elsewhere, po-
litical leaders drafted documents containing the key elements of 
liberal constitutionalism without any genuine intention to im-
plement them.6 Still, the aspiration remained. Some minimal 
show of fealty, a crumb of notional genuflection to liberal demo-
cratic norms, was de rigeur. 
By the end of 2016, however, it was not merely possible, but 
even en vogue for aspiring politicians to question the hegemony 
of liberal democracy.7 Although warning signs aplenty might 
now be discerned, it is possible to single out the June 2016 
Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom and the November 
 
 2 See, for example, Jethro K. Lieberman, Constitutionalism, in Michael T. Gibbons, 
ed, 2 The Encyclopedia of Political Thought 730, 730 (John Wiley & Sons 2014) (“Today 
the idea of constitutionalism comprises a cluster of particular jurisprudential and socio-
logical attributes, summed up as ‘limited government under a higher law.’”), quoting David 
Fellman, Constitutionalism, in P.P. Wiener, ed, 1 Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies 
of Selected Pivotal Ideas 491 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 1973). 
 3 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man 211 (Free Press 1992) 
(“At the end of history, there are no serious ideological competitors left to liberal democ-
racy.”). See also Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Toward Consolidated Democracies, 7 J 
Democracy 14, 15 (Apr 1996) (describing the conditions under which democracy becomes 
“the only game in town”). 
 4 G. John Ikenberry, The Future of the Liberal World Order: Internationalism after 
America, 90 Foreign Aff 56, 58 (May–June 2011). 
 5 See, for example, Adam S. Chilton and Mila Versteeg, The Failure of Constitutional 
Torture Prohibitions, 44 J Legal Stud 417, 446–48 (2015). 
 6 See John W. Meyer, et al, World Society and the Nation-State, 103 Am J So-
ciology 144, 163–64 (1997). See also H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Constitutions without 
Constitutionalism: Reflections on an African Political Paradox, in Douglas Greenberg, et al, 
eds, Constitutionalism and Democracy: Transitions in the Contemporary World 65, 66 
(Oxford 1993). 
 7 Even at the apogee of liberal-democratic celebration, though, doubts were raised 
about how stable the liberal-democratic norm was. See, for example, David Held and 
Anthony McGrew, Globalization and the Liberal Democratic State, 28 Govt & Opposition 
261, 264–66 (1993). For contemporaneous concern that democratization would compro-
mise liberal norms, see generally Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, 76 
Foreign Aff 22 (Nov–Dec 1997). 
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2016 presidential election in the United States as marking, in 
different ways, globally resonant repudiations of the liberal-
democratic norm. 
In both contests, right-of-center populist positions hostile to 
international migration, international and supranational organ-
izations, and the liberal tolerance of different ethnicities and 
faiths prevailed. Their triumphs were part of a wider, right-
leaning “populist explosion” in Europe and Asia,8 albeit one that 
trails an earlier left-leaning populist shift in Latin America.9 
Although they have typically ascended to power via democratic, 
electoral means, populists on both the left and right have de-
parted from liberal-democratic norms in several ways. They 
have repudiated liberal norms of tolerance and openness, re-
stricted press freedom, attacked institutional checks that pro-
mote the rule of law, and catalyzed constitutional and statutory 
transformations that promise to entrench populist coalitions be-
yond fresh democratic defeat.10 At bottom, their political ethics 
track closely Carl Schmitt’s conception of the political as a con-
frontation with an enemy that can be resolved only by the lat-
ter’s complete subordination and even in extremis “physical kill-
ing.”11 Importantly, these departures are neither subterranean 
nor marginal. Instead, they are central planks of the populist 
political agenda. 
In other contexts, we have seen partial or full-blown moves 
toward authoritarianism. Across a range of different geopolitical 
contexts, an increasing number of countries can appropriately be 
characterized as “hybrid” democracies,12 such as competitive au-
thoritarian regimes and “democratorship[s].”13 Even in the absence 
 
 8 See John B. Judis, The Populist Explosion: How the Great Recession Transformed 
American and European Politics 99 (Columbia Global Reports 2016). See also Matt 
Golder, Far Right Parties in Europe, 19 Ann Rev Polit Sci 477, 479 (2016) (exploring the 
populist character of the European hard right). 
 9 See Yannis Stavrakakis, et al, Contemporary Left-Wing Populism in Latin 
America: Leadership, Horizontalism, and Postdemocracy in Chávez’s Venezuela, 58 Latin 
Am Polit & Society 51, 52–53 (Fall 2016). 
 10 Many of these can be ranked forms of “democratic backsliding.” See Nancy 
Bermeo, On Democratic Backsliding, 27 J Democracy 5, 5 (Jan 2016) (defining democrat-
ic backsliding as “the state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institu-
tions that sustain an existing democracy”). 
 11 Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political 26–27, 33 (Chicago 2007) (George 
Swab, trans) (originally published 1932). 
 12 Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 100 Cornell L Rev 391, 395 (2015). 
 13 Kim Lane Scheppele, Worst Practices and the Transnational Legal Order (or How 
to Build a Constitutional “Democratorship” in Plain Sight) *4–5 (working paper 2016), 
archived at http://perma.cc/Q266-MJEK. 
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of a populist turn, at least some elemental fixtures of liberal 
constitutionalism are being unraveled in certain nations—
including conventions for democratic rotation of officeholders 
and against corruption that are far easier to destroy than to cre-
ate anew. In cases like Russia and Turkey, the very possibility 
of near-term rotation in political office no longer seems feasible. 
The formal accoutrements of elections and partisan competition 
persist largely as tattered facades masking increasingly authori-
tarian political formations.14 Liberal constitutionalism, to an in-
creasing degree, provides neither an aspirational lodestar nor an 
accurate description of the dominant constitutional style around 
the world today. 
This Symposium brings together a diverse array of scholars 
to examine the contemporary challenge to liberal constitutional-
ism. Our modest aim in this Introduction is to make the case for 
the existence of the challenge, and then to offer what we hope 
are deliberately provocative comments on why it has largely es-
caped the attention of comparative constitutional scholars until 
quite recently. Although we gesture briefly at some potential 
causal hypotheses, we anticipate that readers will gain greater 
insight into the motivating mechanisms at work from the Essays 
in the Symposium itself. 
Throughout, our focus is on a relatively modest vision of lib-
eral constitutionalism, focusing on its component features de-
scribed above, but not insisting on any particular substantive vi-
sion or content. So conceived, liberal constitutionalism in theory 
is compatible with a wide array of governmental arrangements 
and choices about basic values. It is not, however, compatible 
with a restriction on core liberal rights of association or speech, 
on political competition, or on the rule of law to oversee the 
democratic process.15 
I.  IS LIBERAL DEMOCRACY HEGEMONIC? 
We begin with some evidence that liberal constitutionalism 
reflects neither aspiration nor practice in an increasing array of 
nations and contexts. For reasons of space, we focus mainly on 
 
 14 See Lilia Shevtsova, Forward to the Past in Russia, 26 J Democracy 22, 30–33 
(Apr 2015). 
 15 See Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose Constitutional Democracy, 65 
UCLA L Rev *7–12 (forthcoming 2018), archived at http://perma.cc/57P7-7JC7 (laying 
out a minimalist core of constitutional liberal democracy). 
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attitudes toward, and the practice of, democracy, liberal toler-
ance, and the rule of law. 
Consider first some evidence of public attitudes toward lib-
eral democratic values. It has long been the case that “there is 
generally no connection between specific constitutional choices 
and popular opinion.”16 Rather than speaking to normative aspi-
rations specific to particular populations, twentieth-century con-
stitutions tend to adhere to more universal norms of liberal de-
mocracy.17 More recently, however, data from the World Values 
Survey suggest some decline in support for liberal values and 
democracy. These data suggest that across North America and 
Western Europe, citizens are becoming “more cynical about the 
value of democracy as a political system, less hopeful that any-
thing they do might influence public policy, and more willing to 
express support for authoritarian alternatives.”18 Disturbingly, 
discontent with democracy is concentrated in certain jurisdic-
tions (including the United States) among younger, more 
wealthy cohorts.19 
The retreat of liberal constitutionalism is not confined to 
public attitudes. Between 1974 and 2008, there were fifty-three 
instances in which a democracy shifted either to a “hybrid” or an 
“authoritarian” regime, albeit “in many different ways and for 
many different reasons.”20 The German Bertelsmann Foundation 
has developed a “transformation index” that measures the state 
and quality of democracy in many developing nations.21 It found 
that the number of “highly defective democracies” doubled be-
tween 2006 and 2010, and that by 2010 some 53 of 128 coun-
tries analyzed were “defective democracies.”22 Freedom House 
data from recent years also show an uptake in both authoritar-
ian and hybrid regimes, with slight regression of the number of 
 
 16 Mila Versteeg, Unpopular Constitutionalism, 89 Ind L J 1133, 1137 (2014). 
 17 See Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions, 59 U Chi L 
Rev 519, 522 (1992). 
 18 Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk, The Democratic Disconnect, 27 J Democ-
racy 5, 7 (July 2016). 
 19 See id at 13–14. 
 20 Gero Erdmann, Decline of Democracy: Loss of Quality, Hybridisation and 
Breakdown of Democracy, in Gero Erdmann and Marianne Kneuer, eds, Regression of 
Democracy? 21, 26, 35 (Springer VS 2011). 
 21 See Transformation Index BTI 2016 (Bertelsmann Stiftung), archived at 
http://perma.cc/TNT9-RHJS. 
 22 Joshua Kurlantzick, Democracy in Retreat: The Revolt of the Middle Class and 
the Worldwide Decline of Representative Government 9 (Yale 2013). 
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democracies globally.23 In contrast, the number of military coup 
d’états has declined in recent years.24 Indeed, it is now more 
common for coups to occur in nondemocracies as opposed to de-
railing an ongoing democracy.25 Democratic backsliding, then, oc-
curs after the election of populist parties that use their mandate 
to neutralize the judiciary, dismantle respect for the rule of law, 
and restrict electoral competition. 
These trends manifest across quite distinct geopolitical con-
texts. In Eastern Europe, for example, populist parties such as 
Hungary’s Fidesz and Poland’s Law and Justice Party have en-
acted legal and institutional changes that simultaneously 
squeezed out electoral competition, undermined liberal rights of 
democratic participation, and emasculated legal stability and 
predictability.26 The wave of Bolivarian constitutions in Latin 
America and the partial reversal of democracy in Southeast Asia 
are characterized by many of the same kinds of tactics.27 Finally, 
even as liberal constitutionalism has fallen back in some in-
stances, it has failed to advance elsewhere. The failure of the 
Arab Spring, accompanied by a dizzying collapse into security-
state authoritarianism (Egypt), or even fratricidal civil war 
(Yemen, Syria, Libya), has closed off any possibility of another 
imminent “wave” of democratization. 
Finally, against widely shared expectations, authoritarian 
governments in China, Russia, and elsewhere have not rushed 
to embrace either liberalism or democracy. Rather than touting 
liberal credentials, they instead offer a competing discourse of 
 
 23 Freedom in the World 2016 (Freedom House, 2016), archived at 
http://perma.cc/LE3W-STW5. 
 24 See Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, Global Instances of Coups from 
1950 to 2010: A New Dataset, 48 J Peace Rsrch 249, 255 (2011) (Figure 1). 
 25 See Clayton L. Thyne and Jonathon M. Powell, Coup d’État or Coup d’Autocracy? 
How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008, Foreign Pol Analysis 192, 193 (2016) 
(arguing that coups increase democratization because “the bulk of coups do not happen 
within democracies”). There have been coups in democracies recently, including in 
Mauritania and Thailand. Turkey’s 2016 imbroglio, by contrast, is a failed coup against 
democracy. See Adam Taylor, Map: The World of Coups since 1950 (Wash Post, July 22, 
2016), archived at http://perma.cc/92QX-SA3Z. 
 26 For summaries, see Bojan Bugarič and Tom Ginsburg, The Assault on Post-
communist Courts, 27 J Democracy 69, 72–75 (July 2016); Joanna Fomina and Jacek 
Kucharczyk, The Specter Haunting Europe: Populism and Protest in Poland, 27 J Democ-
racy 58, 62–63 (Oct 2016). 
 27 See David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 UC Davis L Rev 189, 200–07 
(2013) (discussing Colombia and Venezuela). 
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order and authority, or the promise of accelerated economic 
prosperity.28 
II.  WHY IS LIBERAL DEMOCRACY’S STOCK IN DECLINE? 
What explains this bear market in liberal constitutionalism? 
And what are the discrete mechanisms of its demise? There is a 
large set of causal hypotheses to consider, and our review here is 
necessarily superficial. Some tie democratic persistence to eco-
nomic stability.29 The recent financial crisis of 2008 has been 
blamed as a catalytic moment in the movement away from dem-
ocratic practices.30 From outside the state, the disruptive force of 
economic globalization—the global arrangements of financial 
flows, labor competition, and contagious economic disruption—
has jolted states from Thailand to Greece to Iceland.31 Another 
transnational phenomenon—terrorism—diffuses along new 
social and technological networks, provoking states to retrench 
and harden even as it shows the limits of state power. And, in a 
surprising reprise of an old story, de facto empires—American, 
Russian, and Chinese—protecting spheres of influence, have 
subordinated democratic constitutionalism to geopolitical ends. 
Domestic politics also plays a necessary role. Elite polariza-
tion between nationalist and liberal factions has been identified 
as a necessary catalyst of backsliding in some national con-
texts,32 and may well have played a major role in recent devel-
opments in the United States and the United Kingdom. In addi-
tion, scholars have also pointed to a correlation between 
inequality and autocracy.33 The growing gap between the rich 
 
 28 Arch Puddington and Tyler Roylance, The Freedom House Survey for 2016: The 
Dual Threat of Populists and Autocrats, 28 J Democracy 105, 110–11 (Apr 2017). 
 29 See José Alemán and David D. Yang, A Duration Analysis of Democratic 
Transitions and Authoritarian Backslides, 44 Comp Polit Stud 1123, 1143 (2011) (find-
ing that “the best guarantor of democratic consolidation is a high level of socioeconomic 
development”); Adam Przeworski, et al, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions 
and Well-Being in the World 59–69 (Cambridge 2000). 
 30 Judis, Populist Explosion at 109 (cited in note 8). 
 31 See generally Wolfgang Streeck, Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic 
Capitalism (Verso 2014). 
 32 See, for example, Zsolt Enyedi, Populist Polarization and Party System Institu-
tionalization: The Role of Party Politics in De-democratization, 63 Probs Post-
Communism 210, 213 (2016). 
 33 See Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse, Poverty, Inequality, and Democracy: 
Why Democracies Fail, 14 J Democracy 57, 61 (Oct 2008); Adam Przeworski, The Poor 
and the Viability of Democracy, in Anirudh Krishna, ed, Poverty, Participation, and 
Democracy: A Global Perspective 125, 129 (Cambridge 2008). 
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and the poor globally might therefore also be a catalyst for the 
erosion of liberal constitutionalism. Finally, the very practice 
of constitution-making itself can open up new cleavages that 
undermine the social preconditions of liberal constitutionalism.34 
Constitutions, that is, might be intended as devices for inclu-
sion. But through the processes of their formation, they may set 
the stage for their own demise by operating as devices for exclu-
sion and division. 
The Essays in this Symposium explore these various possi-
bilities by giving an account of the various challenges to liberal 
constitutionalism. To begin with, Professor Samuel Issacharoff 
examines the internal structure of democratic polities for clues 
as to the recent wave of backsliding.35 While democracy may of-
fer the most legitimate form of government, it is far from clear 
that it is superior in terms of performance. And key mechanisms 
that facilitate participation—political parties, legislative per-
formance, and a sense of social cohesion—are all in serious and 
accelerating decline.36 Professors Adam Chilton and Mila Versteeg 
focus on another core component of liberal constitutionalism—
namely, the ability of courts to protect constitutional rights. 
This feature is often taken for granted, yet they suggest that 
courts are unable to offer much protection at all.37 
Looking beyond institutional forces, Professors Rosalind 
Dixon and Julie Suk focus on economic inequality as a causal 
factor.38 They contend that the primary mechanisms through 
which liberal constitutions address the issues, namely, rights to 
socioeconomic goods and nondiscrimination, are inadequate to 
the threat, but that structural responses are possible, as both a 
conceptual and empirical matter.39 Professor Richard Epstein, in 
contrast, contests our (and their) account of liberal constitution-
alism, arguing that it is failing because it is overambitious, not 
underambitious.40 
 
 34 For examples, see generally David Landau, Constitution-Making Gone Wrong, 
64 Ala L Rev 923 (2013); Ben Schonthal, Buddhism, Politics and the Limits of Law 
(Cambridge 2016). 
 35 See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Democracy’s Deficits, 85 U Chi L Rev 485 (2018). 
 36 Id at 488. 
 37 Adam S. Chilton and Mila Versteeg, Courts’ Limited Ability to Protect Constitu-
tional Rights, 85 U Chi L Rev 293, 313 (2018). 
 38 See generally Rosalind Dixon and Julie Suk, Liberal Constitutionalism and Eco-
nomic Inequality, 85 U Chi L Rev 369 (2018). 
 39 See id at 377–81. 
 40 Richard A. Epstein, The Wrong Rights, or: The Inescapable Weaknesses of Mod-
ern Liberal Constitutionalism, 85 U Chi L Rev 403, 405 (2018). 
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A series of contributions map the larger geopolitical coordi-
nates of liberal constitutionalism’s decline. First, Professors Aslı 
Bâli and Aziz Rana explore the role of American empire in both 
promoting liberal constitutional form during and after the Cold 
War, but also in shifting priorities in the other direction during 
the Global War on Terror.41 In their account, there is a contin-
uity in the period of American empire, in that liberal concerns 
are subordinated to global security, undermining some democra-
cies in certain times and places.42 Professor Gráinne de Búrca 
also examines the role of international forces, focusing on the 
European Union.43 While itself purporting to advance the values 
of liberal constitutional democracy, Europe famously lacks a 
demos, and may have inspired the nationalist backlash now ob-
taining in many different countries.44 Turning to the economic 
dimension of globalization, Professor David Schneiderman argues 
that the space for liberal democracy has been undermined by the 
constitutionalization of a neoliberal economic order.45 Focusing 
on international investment law, he argues that the space of 
sovereign policymaking has been systematically reduced, put-
ting pressure on political systems that they may not be able to 
withstand.46 Finally, Professor Aziz Huq traces the role of global 
terrorism in triggering one or more pathways of democratic de-
cline.47 Demonstrating that the relationship between terrorism 
and democracy is more complex than it first appears, he con-
tends that state responses to terror can lead to new configura-
tions within the security apparatus, judicial control thereof, and 
the polity itself.48 
A more fundamental conceptual challenge is posed by the 
religious revival in many countries, analyzed by Professors Ran 
Hirschl and Ayelet Shachar.49 As they put it, “The rule of law 
 
 41 See generally Aslı Bâli and Aziz Rana, Constitutionalism and the American Im-
perial Imagination, 85 U Chi L Rev 257 (2018). 
 42 Id at 275. 
 43 See generally Gráinne de Búrca, Is Supranational Governance a Challenge to 
Liberal Constitutionalism?, 85 U Chi L Rev 337 (2018). 
 44 Id at 351–52. 
 45 See generally David Schneiderman, Against Constitutional Excess: Tocquevillian 
Reflections on International Investment Law, 85 U Chi L Rev 585 (2018). 
 46 Id at 588–89. 
 47 See generally Aziz Z. Huq, Terrorism and Democratic Recession, 85 U Chi L Rev 
457 (2018). 
 48 Id at 457–59. 
 49 See generally Ran Hirschl and Ayelet Shachar, Competing Orders: The Challenge 
of Religion to Modern Constitutionalism, 85 U Chi L Rev 425 (2018). 
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and the rule of God appear to be on a collision course.”50 Tracing 
the history of the interaction between these two forces, they em-
phasize the conceptual similarities but also the tensions as these 
two systems regulate the same space.51 
Two Essays focus on modalities and mechanisms through 
which liberal constitutionalism gets eroded. Professor David 
Landau examines the role of formal constitutional change in un-
dermining liberal constitutionalism.52 After categorizing multi-
ple pathways of democratic erosion, he suggests that formal 
amendment is an attractive tool when a regime seeks quick 
change and wants to make this change more durable.53 In addi-
tion, he suggests that when existing provisions are drafted in 
detail, formal amendment might be required.54 Finally, Professor 
Kim Lane Scheppele similarly explores the legal tools that allow 
liberal constitutionalism to be undermined from within.55 The 
“new autocrats,” as she labels them, are masters at preserving 
democratic form without liberal content, presenting a severe and 
nimble set of challenges.56 
III.  WHITHER LIBERAL DEMOCRACY? 
The developments categorized in these Essays raise the 
question whether there are any constitutional features that can 
prevent the erosion of liberal constitutionalism. That is, are there 
some institutional forms that might be better positioned to resist 
the forces that are now on the horizon? Since the American 
Founding, after all, the field of constitutional design has been 
largely oriented to resisting tyranny, among other goals.57 As 
James Madison famously stated, “You must first enable the gov-
ernment to controul the governed; and in the next place oblige it 
to controul itself.”58 What tools, if any, do constitutional design-
ers have at their disposal to prevent those in power from remov-
ing liberal constitutionalism’s constraints? 
 
 50 Id at 425. 
 51 Id at 428–32. 
 52 See generally David Landau, Populist Constitutions, 85 U Chi L Rev 521 (2018). 
 53 Id at 523. 
 54 Id at 536. 
 55 Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U Chi L Rev 545 (2018). 
 56 Id at 571–81. 
 57 See Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Tyrannophobia, in Tom Ginsburg, ed, 
Comparative Constitutional Design 317, 321–22 (Cambridge 2012). 
 58 Federalist 51 (Madison), in The Federalist 347, 349 (Wesleyan 1961) (Jacob E. 
Cooke, ed). 
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The Madisonian answer—namely, providing for separation 
of powers coupled with checks and balances—is less robust than 
meets the eye. Conceived before the advent of modern political 
parties, the Madisonian argument assumes that institutional 
incentives dominate over partisan ones. These incentives have 
proven to be weak in certain times and places, so that when one 
party controls all the various branches of government, the sepa-
ration of powers largely disappears.59 Some systems try to over-
come this tendency by giving the opposition “governance rights,” 
such as the power to chair legislative committees, have repre-
sentation in the judiciary, or hold some executive posts.60 While 
these forms of power sharing can ameliorate the effect of parti-
san dominance, for the most part they are grounded in statute 
or custom rather than constitutional text. Moreover, they might 
do little in the face of a majority intent on pushing through its 
agenda by dismantling the checks.61 
The nature of electoral systems might also guard against 
the erosion of liberal constitutionalism. In general, different 
electoral systems offer different kinds of political incentives to 
cooperate with or dominate others. Much of the work on elec-
toral systems focuses on ethnic conflict, and identifies electoral 
institutions as a source of counterdemocratic potential but also 
as the institutional predicate for cross-ethnic alliances.62 Many 
have argued for a system of proportional representation (PR) 
that might provide for superior representation of diverse inter-
ests and more robust democratic participation.63 
Without plumbing this complex subject in depth here, we 
simply observe that PR systems also have significant downsides. 
While ensuring the representation of electoral minorities, PR sys-
tems can provide a platform for the very populist “anti-system 
 
 59 See Daryl J. Levinson and Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 
119 Harv L Rev 2312, 2312–16 (2006). For a challenge to this claim, see generally David 
Fontana and Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85 U Chi L Rev 
1 (2018) (arguing that commentators understate the effects of institutional loyalties). 
 60 See David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 Yale L J 548, 571–81 (2009). 
 61 For elaboration of this point, see generally Huq and Ginsburg, 65 UCLA L Rev 
(cited in note 15). 
 62 See, for example, Sujit Choudhry, Bridging Comparative Politics and Compara-
tive Constitutional Law: Constitutional Design in Divided Societies, in Soujit Choudry, 
ed, Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accommodation 3, 3–15 
(Oxford 2008) (reviewing this literature). 
 63 See Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance 
in Thirty-Six Countries 303–05 (Yale 1999). 
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parties” that seek to disrupt liberal constitutionalism.64 It is no 
accident that such parties first emerged in PR systems, such as 
Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark.65 At the same 
time, because PR systems require coalition governments, popu-
list sentiments may well be moderated through collaboration 
with establishment parties. This has not been so in winner-
takes-all systems, such as the United States. These experiences 
suggest that PR might make it easier for antisystemic populist 
parties to play some role in national governance, but then may 
mitigate the possibility of their wholesale capture of state auth-
ority. The data are hardly conclusive, though, and more study is 
surely wanted. 
Another common choice for liberty-enhancing constitutional 
design is federalism.66 By dividing authority among multiple 
levels of government, federalism is thought to reduce the stakes 
of political competition at the national level, while increasing 
the number of governments that must be controlled to exercise 
complete authority. But federalism might not be the panacea that 
many believe. While it can facilitate local resistance to national-
level authoritarian impulses, it can also immunize local authori-
tarian regimes from national-level democratic pressures. This 
was the history of the Jim Crow South in the United States, 
and has been also identified in countries like Argentina and 
Mexico.67 A recent undemocratic turn in North Carolina provides 
a further illustration of this point.68 
Federalism is also celebrated because it can facilitate the 
spread of democratically motivated policy ideas across state 
borders. Yet the effect is again symmetric: federalism can also 
 
 64 Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Struc-
tures, Incentives and Outcomes 67 (NYU 1997) (finding PR inferior to double-ballot systems 
as a means of penalizing “anti-system parties”). See also generally Giovanni Capoccia, Anti-
system Parties: A Conceptual Reassessment, 14 J Theoretical Polit 9 (2002). 
 65 See Robert W. Jackman and Karin Volpert, Conditions Favouring Parties of the 
Extreme Right in Western Europe, 26 British J Polit Sci 501, 517 (1996) (“[E]lectoral pro-
portionality and multi-partism are systemic factors that together facilitate parties of the 
extreme right.”). 
 66 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum L Rev 
543, 543–44 (1954) (noting that “federalism must appear to many peoples as the sole al-
ternative to tyranny”). 
 67 See Edward L. Gibson, Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Fed-
eral Democracies 72–148 (Cambridge 2012). 
 68 See Huq and Ginsburg, 65 UCLA L Rev at *69–70 (cited in note 15); Andrew 
Reynolds, North Carolina Is No Longer Classified as a Democracy (Charlotte News & 
Observer, Dec 22, 2016), archived at http://perma.cc/CLL6-6MLN. 
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facilitate the diffusion of innovations in antidemocratic govern-
ance. For example, in the past decade, numerous US states intro-
duced strict voter identification laws in a coordinated effort to 
dampen turnout among minority voters.69 As a result, Justice 
Louis Brandeis’s famous notion, that states can serve as “labora-
tories of democracy,”70 might better be rephrased to the more 
neutral “laboratories of governance.” Thus, whereas to our 
knowledge, there exists no empirical evidence of a federalism 
power-constraining effect, it is also not obvious that federalism 
ultimately enables liberal constitutionalism. 
Another familiar candidate is a judicially protected bill of 
rights. By carving out a zone of interests free from policymaking, 
constitutional rights can serve to facilitate democracy, and in-
deed under many definitions are an essential component of it.71 
But as Professors Chilton and Versteeg have shown, certain 
constitutional rights often fail to constrain governments.72 While 
democracies tend to protect constitutional rights more robustly 
than dictatorships, this seems to be because they are democra-
cies. Rights like the freedom of expression, the freedom of 
movement, and the prohibition of torture are easily trampled on, 
even in democratic regimes.73 Other rights, however––mainly 
those that are practiced collectively, such as the freedom of reli-
gion or the right to unionize––might serve as barriers against 
government crackdown, at least temporarily.74 On balance, the 
empirical evidence suggests that constitutional rights are no sil-
ver bullet. 
Perhaps the most trusted institution to protect liberal demo-
cracy is the judicial branch. In constitutional theory, judicial re-
view is viewed as the ropes that, in Homer’s parable, bind 
Ulysses to the mast of his ship so that he can resist the singing 
of the Sirens.75 Constitutional courts do so by invalidating laws 
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and regulations that violate constitutional protections, thereby 
simultaneously guarding democracy against authoritarian back-
sliding and the tyranny of the majority.76 However, courts can-
not be assumed to serve as robust protectors of rights without 
an account of the incentives that judges have to provide such 
protections. One must ask why judges are likely to stand up to 
government and why it is that political actors and government 
officials obey the pronouncements of judges. 
A long line of political science scholarship has come to argue 
that courts’ enforcement of rights occur fundamentally at the 
margins.77 The Symposium contribution by Chilton and Versteeg 
fits within this line of research, finding that courts do little to im-
prove constitutional-rights protections.78 While courts, because of 
the nature of their appointment processes, serve as a kind of lag 
on changes in a government regime, a sustained political coali-
tion will inevitably be able to bend the judiciary to its overall 
agenda.79 Even though it may be the case that, as Professor 
Issacharoff has written, the “transition to democracy is eased by 
the creation of a court system specifically tasked with constitu-
tional vigilance over the exercise of political power,”80 we do not 
yet have an account of how well courts can resist attempts to in-
fluence or sideline them after that transition is complete. Recent 
accounts from Hungary, Poland, and Turkey are not hearten-
ing.81 Transitions to democracy seem to be accompanied by an 
expansion of judicial power, but transitions away from it often 
involve a contraction. 
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In short, there is no foolproof constitutional design that can 
immunize liberal democracy from the pressures of backsliding. 
At best, constitutional design features serve as speed bumps to 
slow the agglomeration and abuse of political power; they cannot 
save us from our worst selves completely.82 Empirical research 
instead hints that the most powerful brakes on transgressions of 
power might be extraconstitutional in nature, and come in the 
form of peaceful protests.83 It is crowds marching the streets, 
and the people taking it upon themselves to enforce the social 
contract, that ultimately are the best protector of liberal consti-
tutionalism.84 Constitutional design features, by contrast, pro-
vide at best mere temporary protection for such mobilization. 
IV.  WHY HAVE COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISTS NOT (YET) 
ADDRESSED LIBERAL DEMOCRACY’S DEMISE? 
There is something of a disconnect between our analysis and 
the prevailing mood in the comparative constitutional literature. 
By and large, the leading scholars in that field have been quite 
bullish on the prospects of liberal constitutionalism. Our view is 
deliberately more cautious. We believe that a misguided confi-
dence in liberal constitutionalism’s invulnerability can be dan-
gerous, as it can cause us to underestimate the fragility of liber-
al constitutionalism. Further, we think the literature is 
characterized by some systematic blind spots as a consequence 
of research-design choices that have caused it to overestimate 
liberal constitutionalism’s strength. 
Optimism on behalf of liberal constitutionalism in part re-
sults from scholars’ selective focus on a small set of high-profile 
countries, such as South Africa, Canada, India, and, more recent-
ly, Colombia.85 For example, Professor Issacharoff’s important 
book, which highlights the role of constitutional courts in protect-
ing fledgling democracy, offers a wide array of examples from 
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around the world, but largely focuses on cases in which courts 
seemingly made a difference.86 In general, comparative scholars 
marveled at the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s furiously 
striking down legislation in the early 1990s,87 the Colombian 
Constitutional Court’s preventing President Álvaro Uribe from 
running for a third term,88 or the South African Constitutional 
Court’s enforcement of socioeconomic rights.89 By contrast, the 
literature has to date devoted scant attention to countries whose 
constitutions appear to have little impact on government behav-
ior, or where rights-enforcing court rulings are ignored.90 This 
case selection might explain why the literature is bullish on con-
stitutional rights’ prospects. 
In addition, many studies focus on constitutionalism’s im-
pact on litigation rather than broader social change. For exam-
ple, Professor Charles Epp’s famous study concludes that consti-
tutional rights bring about “rights revolutions” because they are 
continuously being litigated by civil-society groups and enforced 
by courts.91 Implementation and the resulting shifts in govern-
mental practice, however, fall outside his analysis.92 This same 
focus on judicial behavior characterizes much of the literature.93 
While litigation is undoubtedly important, there is no guarantee 
that judicial enforcement of constitutional rights will actually 
change government practices. After all, courts’ orders can 
simply be ignored or invite backlash. Indeed, Professor Gerald 
Rosenberg’s famous study of the US Supreme Court shows 
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that despite important rights-protecting decisions, the Court 
has often been ignored or been only of limited efficacy.94 One 
does not have to dig deep to find similar tales in other countries. 
The focus on a limited set of cases, and on litigation rather 
than social outcomes, might also explain why recent quantita-
tive studies are substantially less optimistic about constitution-
alism’s prospects.95 After all, quantitative studies include a wid-
er range of countries and tend to focus on social outcomes, such 
as actual rights practices or social spending, rather than litiga-
tion rates. This aspect of the qualitative–quantitative divide has 
been well documented in related other fields, such as interna-
tional human-rights law,96 and might explain the divergent pic-
tures painted on constitutionalism’s prospect. 
Of course, it is important to study judicial enforcement and 
to map and understand success stories, as these hold important 
lessons for how constitutionalism can succeed. But it is im-
portant to be aware that such successes might be fleeting—the 
exception rather than the rule. It is only when we take seriously 
the possibility of constitutionalism’s failure that we can get seri-
ous about studying how it might survive. 
CONCLUSION 
It is by now reasonably clear that adherents to liberal con-
stitutionalism as a set of normative values—and we count our-
selves in that camp—face a new and unexpected set of chall-
enges. The threats to liberal constitutionalism are quite literally 
closer to home than we had thought, and moving much faster 
than we might have hoped. We have started to spell those 
threats out here. The Essays in this Symposium further explore 
the causes and consequences of new threats to liberal constitu-
tionalism. We hope their contributions resound not merely in 
scholarly terms, but also as interventions in a larger public de-
bate that should concern us all about the nature of the polities 
in which we live. 
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